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S ection 202 of Executive Order 11246 mandates that government
contractors "take affirmative action to ensure" nondiscriminatory
hiring and treatment of their employees.' If a contractor practices such
discrimination, a federal agency which is charged with enforcement
responsibility may impose various sanctions. 2 Unfortunately, the sanc-
tions which have been employed to end section 202 violations have
proven inadequate: they do not constitute a satisfactory remedy be-
cause they fail to restore to the employee benefits which are lost be-
cause of the contractor's actions. Complete restoration can occur only
if back pay is awarded to the aggrieved employee. When added to other
sanctions, back pay makes the employee whole and renders the discrim-
ination nugatory.
Currently, federal agencies charged with enforcement responsi-
bility refuse to require back pay because such awards are not spe-
cifically provided for in either Executive Order 11246 or the regula-
Much of the material which appears in this article was gathered by the author
while he was serving as Attorney-Adviser in the Office of the General Counsel, Civil
Rights Division, United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
t Member, New York Bar. B.A., Yale, 1965; LL.B., Virginia, 1968.
1. Exec. Order No. 11246 § 202(1), 3 C.F.R. 419 (Supp. 1972), provides as
follows:
Except in contracts exempted in accordance with Section 204 of this Order,
all Government contracting agencies shall include in every Government contract
hereafter entered into the following provisions:
"During the performance of this contract, the contractor agrees as follows:
"(1) The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant
for employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The
contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed,
and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Such action shall include, but not
be limited to the following: employment, upgrading, demotion, or transfer; re-
cruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or
other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including apprentice-
ship. The contractor agrees to post in conspicuous places, available to em-
ployees and applicants for employment, notices to be provided by the con-
tracting officer setting forth the provisions of this nondiscrimination clause.
2. See id. § 202(6), 3 C.F.R. at 419-20 which provides for various sanctions in
the event of noncompliance.
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tions issued pursuant thereto. This article contends that back pay
awards are an appropriate remedy which may be imposed by enforce-
ment agencies. The contention is supported by: an analysis of the pro-
visions and objectives of the Executive Order; a discussion of the
power of an agency to require back pay; a consideration of the
purpose and nature of back pay as affecting its legality; and a review
of the willingness of federal courts to imply remedies where they are
needed to effectuate the purposes of a statute.
I. EXECUTIVE ORDER 11246
Issued in 1965 by President Johnson, Executive Order 11246 has
as its purpose the attainment of equal employment opportunity in the
employment practices of employers who are parties to contracts with
federal agencies.
The Executive Order provides in section 202 that contracts and
subcontracts of federal contractors must contain an equal employment
opportunity -clause, which clause contractually obligates such contrac-
tors not to discriminate in their employment practices on grounds of
race, color, national origin, religion, or sex and requires them to take
"affirmative action" to ensure all applicants and employees are treated
without regard to those same grounds.3 Affirmative action is defined as
including, but not being limited to: "employment, upgrading, demo-
tion, or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or
termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation, and selec-
tion for training, including apprenticeship." 4 Further, "in the event of
the Contractor's noncompliance... [he] may be declared ineligible for
further Government contracts . .. and such other sanctions may be
imposed and remedies invoked as provided in Executive Order 11246
of September 24, 1965, or by rule, regulation or order of the Secre-
tary of Labor.. . ."5 From these provisions, back pay as a remedy for
breach of the equal opportunity clause apparently is within the author-
ity of the Secretary of Labor.
To determine whether a federal contractor is in compliance with
the requirements of the Executive Order during the term of a contract
or subcontract, a federal agency makes compliance reviews to learn
3. Id. § 202 (1), 3 C.F.R. 419.
- 4.4d.
5. Id. § 202(6), 3 C.F.R. 419-20 (emphasis added).
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if the contractor is discriminating against applicants or employees and,
where necessary, to determine the extent of affirmative action taken by
the contractor to seek employees of those groups against which it'has
discriminated in the past. Once discriminatory practices or a lack of
affirmative action has been identified, the compliance agency attempts
to negotiate with the contractor to obtain commitments which will, put
it into compliance. As this article will establish, one of the commitments
which the agency legally can and should require as an element of this
voluntary compliance process is the remedy of back pay.
II. THE POWER TO REQUIRE BACK PAY
A. Imposing Sanctions not Provided for-The Administrative
Procedure Act
An important point with respect to back pay awards under the
Executive Order concerns whether the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) ,6 precludes an administrative requirement of back pay with-
otit Statutory authorization. "Sanction" is defined in section 2 (f) as
including: "(5) assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution,
compensation, costs, charges or fees ... . " Such sanctions may be im-
posed by a whole or a part of an agency.8 Further, the APA requires
the following: "A sanction may not be imposed or a substantive rule
or order issued except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and
as authorized by law."9 If we concede that back pay would probably
be included under section 2 (f) and thus be a "sanction" to be imposed
only where authorized by law,10 the question becomes whether the fact
that back'pay is not specifically provided for in the Executive Order
means it cannot be required of a noncomplying contractor as a part
of his compliance with the equal opportunity provisions of his contract.
The legislative history of the APA shows a change in the limita-
tion of the imposition of sanctions under section 9 (a) in the original
draft: those "as specified and authorized by statute,"-" was changed to
6. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1966).
7. Id. Administrative Procedure Act § 2(f), 5 U.S.C. § 551(10) (E) (1970) (em-
phasis added).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 9(a), 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
10. This seems reasonable since "reimbursement, restitution, (and] compensation"
are elements of back pay and are within the contemplation of section 2(f).
11. SENATE COMPARATV PRINT, S. Doc. No. 7, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 159 (1945).
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those "as specified and authorized by law." (Emphasis added.) This
modification from "statute" to "law" was intended to permit agencies
to impose sanctions that were authorized by treaties, court decisions,
commonly recognized administrative practices or other law, as well
as by statutes.12 Case law had recognized that the authority for agency
action may be either specific or general, with the latter including both
common practices and court decisions.13 This was recognized by both
the Senate and House Reports issued pursuant to the passage of the
APA. The House Committee on the Judiciary noted that the range of
sanctions available to administrative agencies is limited to those for
which general or specific authorization has been given,14 and further
emphasized that the bill sets forth "the general limitations on ad-
ministrative powers" in section 9.15 The Senate Committee stated that
"agencies may not undertake anything which statutes or other appro-
priate sources of authority... do not authorize them to do." It added
that where sources are general, "no authority beyond the generality
granted may be exercised."'16 It is clear then that statutes were not in-
tended to be the only source of authority for agency activity and that
where an agency imposes sanctions under authority which might be
called "general," it is up to the courts to determine whether the agency
has exceeded its authority.
In considering this question, the Supreme Court looks to the
statute pursuant to which the agency is acting and decides whether the
sanctions imposed, although not specifically provided by the statute,
will effectuate its general purpose as intended by the legislators who
passed the law. If so, the agency will be found to have acted within its
authority.'7
In considering the limits of "general" authority, former Attorney
General Clark pointed out that while many powers of an agency are
12. T. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE APA 88 (1947). This con-
cept of agencies deriving authority for their sanctions from sources other than statutes
began with an early Supreme Court case, United States v. MacDaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
1, 1,3-14 (1833). MacDaniel was a suit by the federal government to recover wages and
commissions from an employee of the Navy who had been improperly appointed by a
former Secretary of the Navy. The Court held that, notwithstanding the error, Mac-
Daniel did not have to forfeit his wages and commissions because he provided services
in his position for fifteen years and his status had been sanctioned by all the subsequent
Secretaries since his appointment.
13. See, e.g., Alaska Steamship Co. v. United States, 290 U.S. 256 (1933).
14. H.R. REPv. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1946).
15. Id. at 17.
16. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1945).
17. Federal Trade Comm. v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
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clearly set forth in the Act creating it, other powers "may be readily
inferred from the framework of the Act creating the agency or may be
logically necessary for the conduct of the powers granted to the
agency.""' Whether powers of an agency are expressed or implied, they
may be exercised.
A statute expressive of such large public policy as that on which
the National Labor Relations Board is based must be broadly phrased'
and necessarily carries with it the task of administrative application.
'There is an area plainly covered by the language of the Act and an
area no less plainly without it. But in the nature of things Congress
could not catalogue all the devices and strategems for circumventing
the policies of the Act. Nor could it define the whole gamut of the
remedies to effectuate these policies in an infinite variety of specific
situations. Congress met these difficulties by leaving the adaptation
of means to end the empiric process of administration.... [T]he re-
lation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter of administrative
competence .... 19
B. The Concepts of Sanction and Remedy Under the Executive Order
Section 209 of the Executive Order sets forth certain specific
sanctions and penalties which a contracting agency may invoke against
a contractor who is not in compliance. 20 Back pay is not one of the
enumerated sanctions. It is most important at this point to consider
the relationship between the term "sanction" as used under the Execu-
tive Order, and its definition under the APA as discussed earlier.
Section 209 refers to five specific items, none of which involves correc-
tive action for individual discriminatees. These sanctions and penal-
ties appear designed to uphold the public interest in enforcement of
the equal opportunity clause (section 202) by action against contrac-
tors such as denial of federal contracts or by institution of judicial pro-
ceelings. They often operate as a forfeiture of the violator's property
or some right to which he is usually entitled, and come within the APA
section 2(f)(3) definition of sanction as a "penalty." They are not de-
signed to make the discriminatee whole or to rectify in any way past
discrimination.
However, the term "sanction" as defined by section 2(f)(5) of the
APA ("assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensa-
18. T. CLARK, supra note 12, at 89.
19. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) (emphasis added).
20. Exec. Order No. 11246 § 209, C.F.R. 422-23 (Supp. 1972), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e. (1970).
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tion, costs, charges, or fees") also includes what are normally termed
remedies, for those discriminated against. Thus a back pay award
remedy, which under the Executive Order would be corrective action
designed to make the discriminatee whole and to rectify past discrimina-
tion, would be a sanction by the APA definition. According to subpart
B, clause (6) of section 202 of the Executive Order, the noncompli-
ance of a contractor may be met with "such ... sanctions.., and reme-
dies.., as provided in Executive Order No. 11246... or by rule, regu-
lation or order of the Secretary of Labor, or as otherwise provided by
law." (Emphasis added.) Consequently, "sanctions" specified in the
APA may be utilized under the Executive Order's authorization.2'
C. Back Pay and the Contractual Obligation
When a federal agency enters into a contract, it does so with the
intent of obtaining an enforceable right to performance of the terms
of the agreement-including the equal opportunity clause of Execu-
tive Order 11246. As with any other contractor, the United States
Government is entitled to pursue "any appropriate remedies for breach
of the obligations agreed to by its contractors, and needs no specific
authorization for judicial enforcement of its rights." 22
As a matter of law, an agency may require complete equality in
employment practices. Since paying individuals unequal salaries for
the same work, based on race, sex, color, religion and national origin
constitutes discrimination, performance on the part of the employer
would necessarily seem to require back pay awards. That is, the or-
ganization with whom the agency has a contract has a contractual ob-
ligation not to discriminate and where it has been found to be in vio-
lation of that obligation, it can only fulfill the contract by doing what
it should have done initially-paying equal wages for equal work.
Under ordinary rules of contract law, the failure of a contractor
to comply with the nondiscrimination clause is a breach of contract
for which the United States is entitled to an appropriate remedy by
way of damages, rescission or injunction against a contractor. The fact,
21. It might be argued that this section is addressed to remedies against the con-
tractor rather than affirmative action to "make whole" individual discriminatees. If this
construction were accepted, the provisions might be inapplicable to our situation.
However, I do not accept this construction, and am of the opinion that in any case,
back pay can be required as a remedy. This contention will be supported in subsequent
parts of this article.
22. 42 Op. AiT'Y GEN. 21 (1961).
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however, that back pay is nowhere mentioned in the contract clause,
or the regulation issued pursuant to the Executive Order, presents a
question of contract interpretation and construction which bears con-
sideration.
As noted in Corbin, section 561,
A contract includes not only the promises set forth in express words,
but in addition all such implied provisions as are indispensable to ef-
fectuate the intention of the parties and as arise from the language
of the contract and the circumstances under which it was made. .... s
In cases where the major incident of discrimination against an indi-
vidual is payment of lower wages than his or her counterpart, back
pay 'should be considered an implied requirement "indispensable to
effectuate the intention of the parties" which arises from.the contract
language and surrounding circumstances. (This would be so even if
section 202 (6) of the Executive Order, which does not specifically
provide for back pay awards, is viewed as the authority for a contracting
agency to seek remedies by a contractor for discrimination clauses of
its contracts. The purpose of this provision, expressly agreed to by the
contractor in signing the contract, is to provide a remedy under the
Executive Order in unequal wage cases found to be based on illegal
discrimination.) Back pay is the only effective remedy to eliminate the
salar4 inequities and to make the discriminatees whole. In addition
Corbin notes in section 550 that it is a rule that public contracts and
other contracts by which the public interest is affected shall be "con-
strued in the manner most favorable to the public." Surely, in con-
tracts containing the equal employment opportunity clause, to remedy
discrimination is in the public interest.
III. THE PUR.POSES AND NATURE OF A BACK PAY REMEDY
Section 202 (1) of the Executive Order requires a contractor to
agree' that during the performance of his contract with the Govern-
ment, he "will take affirmative action ... " and "such action shall in-
clude... rates of pay or other forms of compensation." As the govern-
ment contractor's affirmative action obligation clearly requires him to
take whatever remedial action necessary with regard to pay rates in
the absence of discrimination, surely affirmative, action in- this regard
23. 3 A. CORBI9, CONTRACTS § 561-n.1 (2d ed. 1960).
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is required where it is proven that a contractor has discriminated in the
past. A victim of discrimination is not made whole until he receives
earnings lost as a result of his employer's discriminatory practices. He
remains in a position beneath that of his co-workers and continues to
feel the impact of his minority status. In effect then, there is a con-
tinuation of the discrimination against him, and a continuing viola-
tion of the equal opportunity clause, until he receives an award of
back pay. "Only thus can there be a restoration of the situation, as
nearly as possible to that which would have obtained but for the
illegal disci-imination. ' 24 And only in this way can a contractor cure
his defective performance under the clause.
The concept of "affirmative action," as used in the Executive
Order, when viewed in the light of its usage in the National Labor
Relations Act, section 10 (c) ,25 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, section 706 (g) ,6 seems to include back pay as a remedy. Sec-
tion 10 (c) of the NLRA specifically requires individuals found to have
been engaged in unfair labor practices "to take such affirmative action
including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as
will effectuate the polices of this subchapter, 27 while section 706 (g)
allows a court to "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or with-
out back pay .... ,"2 The Supreme Court has specifically indicated that
the mention of back pay in the NLRA is illustrative of the require-
ment of affirmative action to remedy past discrimination.
2
1
24. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
29. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). An employer argued that
Congress had intended to exclude the remedy of discriminatory termination of em-
ployment from coverage under the National Labor Relations Act by the phrase "in-
cluding reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies of the Act," and the court stated:
Experience having demonstrated that discrimination in hiring is twin to dis-
crimination in firing, it would indeed be surprising if Congress gave a remedy
for the one which it denied for the other.... Attainment of a great national
policy through expert administration in collaboration with limited judicial
review must not be confined within narrow canons for equitable relief deemed
suitable by chancellors in ordinary private controversies .... To differentiate
between discrimination in denying employment and in terminating it, would be
a differentiation not only without substance but in defiance of that against which
the prohibition of discrimination is directed.
But, we are told, this is precisely the differentiation Congress has made.
It has done so, the argument runs, by not directing the Board "to take such
446
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The rationale for a back pay remedy has been extensively con-
sidered in, the legislative history and cases involving section 10 (c) of
the NLRA. In hearings held pursuant to the passage of section 10 (c)
in the House of Representatives, the Committee on Labor noted:
The most frequent form of affirmative action required in cases of this
type [referring to unfair labor practices] is specifically provided for,
i.e., the reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as the
circumstances dictate. No private rights of action is contemplated.
Essentially the unfair labor practices listed are matters of public
concern . . .; the proceeding is in the name of the Board upon the
Board's formal complaint.30 '
Back pay orders were seen to have the primary function of acting as
a remedy for conditions created by unfair labor practices with the in-
cidental consequences of providing compensation for the employee and
punishment for the employer, the latter serving the deterrent function
of discouraging employers from engaging in unfair labor practices by
requiring them to make good losses which their violations of the law
have caused.
The Supreme Court considered the question of remedies other
than back pay ordered by the Labor Board in Virginia Electric & Power
Co. v. NLRB.31 The Board had ordered the employer to reinstate
with back pay two employees found to have been discriminatorily dis-
charged and, in addition, to reimburse all its employees in the amount
of dues and other deductions made from wages on behalf of a union
the Board had ordered disestablished. The company appealed. In dis-
cussing the Board's discretion, the Court stated that the particular
means by which the effects of unfair labor practices are to be expunged
are matters "for the Board not the courts to determine." 32 Thus, it
noted, the Board's exercise of discretion resulting in a decision to de-
mand reimbursement of "checked-off dues" will stand "unless it can
be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than
affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of this Act," simpliciter, but,
instead, by empowering the Board "to take such affirmative action, including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies of this Act." To attribute such a function to the participial phrase in-
troduced by "including" is to shrivel a versatile principle to an illustrative
application.
Id. at 187-89. The Executive Order clearly provides such jurisdiction.
30. H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1935).
31. 319 U.S. 533 (1943).
32. Id. at 539, quoting from I.A. of M. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 82 (1940).
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those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act."8
The Court found that the ordered remedy appeared "manifestly
reasonable" and promoted the policies of the Act in "substantially
the same manner as would a back pay award." The reimbursement
order was not a redress for a private wrong. Like back pay, the remedy
restored to employees what had been wrongfully taken from them due
to the company's contravention of the Act.
In the section of the opinion most significant for the purposes of
this article, the Court offered that both monetary awards (back pay
and reimbursement), though they resemble compensation for private
injury, are "remedies created by statute-one explicitly and the other
implicitly in the concept of effectuation of the policies of the Act-
which are designed to aid in achieving the elimination of industrial
conflict. They vindicate public, not private rights." 84 Thus, it con-
cluded, it would be erroneous to characterize the reimbursement order
as penal and wrong to fetter the Board's discretion by compelling it to
observe conventional common law or chancery principles in fashion-
ing such an order.
The only discussion of the rationale for back pay awards pur-
suant to title VII was in Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co.,)" a class suit by
female employees who allegedly were laid off because of sex discrimina-
tion by their employer. The defendant had restricted female employees
to jobs not requiring the lifting of more than thirty-five pounds. The
Seventh Circuit, in awarding back pay to the plaintiffs, held that
[t]he clear purpose of Title VII is to bring an end to the proscribed
discriminatory practices and to make whole, in a pecuniary fashion,
those who have suffered by it. To permit only injunctive relief in the
class action would frustrate the implementation of the strong Con-
gressional purpose expressed in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.30
Under both section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act and
section 706 (g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, back pay awards have
a public purpose in serving to effectuate the policies of the Acts and
do not amount to a private remedy. These awards are elements of af-
firmative action which serve to make the employee suffering discrimina-
tion "whole" by attempting to restore the situation which would have
33. Id. at 540.
34. Id. at 543.
35. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
36.' Id. at 720.'
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existed. but for the discrimination. Under the Executive Order, back
pay awards would similarly have a public purpose and not amount to
private relief. Just as the elimination of unfair labor practices is a
public concern, so is discrimination by an employer, and back pay in
each situation, while incidentally providing compensation for the em-
ployee, serves primarily as a deterrent against an employer acting
similarly in the future. It would also aid in the enforcement of the
Executive Order as it does the National Labor Relations Act due to
the high cost to a violator of awarding back pay. And just as with the
Board, the agency administering the Executive Order in a particular
situation would most probably act as the agent of the discriminatee
and thus as a claimant for the back pay award while the injured em-
ployee would play no active role whatsoever in the proceedings.
The major difference, of course, between section 10 (c) and the
Executive Order is that in the former, back pay is one of the stated
remedies while it is not provided for in any way in the latter. Yet the
Stipreme Court in Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB, seems to be
stating that where a remedy is implied by an administrative agency
pursuant to a statute and serves to effectuate the policies of the statute
in a reasonable way, it will not be struck down by the courts. It is
submitted that this is the role that back pay would play under the
Executive Order.
Neither the Railway Labor Act 7 nor the Fair Labor Standards
Act 8 has specific provisions for back pay awards as remedies. Never-
theless, several courts have ruled that such a remedy would be appro-
priate under circumstances where it is established that employees have
wrongfully suffered at the hands of employers and the back pay remedy
is found necessary to effectuate the purpose of the act involved.
Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc.,.9 involving the Federal
Fair Labor Standards Act, is illustrative.
There the Supreme Court considered whether a district court is
empowered to order reinstatement for wages lost because of unlawful
discharge or other discrimination and ruled that jurisdiction to award
back pay, for violations by an employer of section 15(a)(3) 40 of the
Fair Labor Standards Act exists in suits by the Secretary of Labor
37. 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1971).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970).
39. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1970).
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under section 1741 of the Act. Section 15(a)(3) makes it unlawful for
an employer covered by the Act
to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any em-
ployee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted
or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this
Act ....
Section 17 gives the district court its jurisdiction to hear Fair Labor
Standards Act cases as follows:
for cause shown, to restrain violations of section 15: provided, that no
court shall have jurisdiction in any action brought by the Secretary
of Labor to restrain such violations, to order the payment to employees
of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation or an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages in such action.
The specific issue before the Court, then, was whether, in an action
under section 17 of the Act by the Secretary of Labor to enjoin viola-
tions of section 15(a)(3), a district court is empowered to order re-
imbursement for wages lost because of unlawful discharge or other
discrimination involving an employee.
The Court discussed the central aim of the Act as being to at-
tain certain minimum labor standards, which the Court viewed as best
achieved by relying on information and complaints received from em-
ployees seeking to vindicate their rights under the Act. Provisions
against discriminatory discharges were included to help produce ef-
fective enforcement where reliance is on such complaints (referring
to sections 15(a)(3) and 17). Back pay awards were seen as a means
of encouraging employees with legitimate grievances to make their
complaint without fear of discharge and total loss of wages for the pe-
riod necessary to seek and obtain reinstatement.42 Thus, back pay was
found to be compensatory, and invoking of back pay jurisdiction by a
court in a section 17 action by the Secretary of Labor was not punitive
(as argued by the respondents), but rather proper as a public remedy
for violation of section 15(a)(3).
It is clear from an analysis of the foregoing cases that back pay
as an equitable remedy will be fashioned by a court to: maintain and
reconstruct the status quo, provide retroactive compensation, protect
employee's benefits against lapse of time, aid in enforcement of the
41. Id. § 217.
42. 361 U.S. at 290, 292.
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particular statute involved, and provide money damages as incident to
reinstatement or to judicial order of future action. The federal courts
have exhibited a willingness to order back pay as a remedy to protect
damaged employees in situations where such awards were not spe-
cifically provided for by statute or regulation. 43 The decisions speak of
the necessity for back pay as a means of effectuating the purpose of the
statute pursuant to which the agency is acting. It is clear from these
decisions that the courts involved placed no limitations on the impo-
sition of the back pay remedy. There is nothing to indicate that the
Railway Labor Board or the Labor Department would be precluded
from requiring such a remedy to acheive a purpose consistent with
that of the Railway Labor Act or the Fair Labor Standards Act. And
most importantly, the courts did not reserve the power to impose the
remedy to themselves.
IV. IMPLICATION OF REMEDIES
In many different areas of the law, the federal courts have shown
a willingness to imply a damages remedy, even though such a remedy
was not specifically provided by the statute involved in the case. A
consideration of decisions involving the implication of remedies is
important in order to determine in what situations the courts find it
appropriate to do so.4 This will provide a further basis for predicting
the judicial response to agency imposition of back pay pursuant to the
Executive Order.
In the area of civil rights, courts have, until recently, been re-
luctant to imply a damages remedy.45
But in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics," an action for damages based on violation of the fourth
amendment by a federal agent acting under color of law, the Second
Circuit ruled that a remedy could be implied for constitutional as
well as statutory violations.4 However, it noted that although dam-
ages as well as equitable remedies have been implied to enforce the
43. See Chambers v. United States, No. 141-70 (U.S. Ct. Cl., Oct. 15, 1971) and
Allison v. United States, No. 507-69 (U.S. Ct. Cl., Oct. 15, 1971), as additional cases
tending to demonstrate the willingness of federal courts to find back pay within the
Executive Order. 0
44. See Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HAsv.
L. REv. 285, 290 (1963).
45. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
46. 409 F.2d 718 (1969).
47. Id. at 721.
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right to compensation for condemnation under the fifth amendment,!
the damages remedy is not implicit in the fourth amendment since
there are other ways to preserve the validity of the amendment.49 The
court specifically referred to the existence of a remedy at common law
in a tort action for trespass or invasion of privacy in a state court, reason-
ing that the fact that the amendment is designed to protect a com-
mon law right does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that, there is
a federal remedy. Thus, it concluded that a damages remedy is less
"essential" to guarantee the enforcement of a constitutional right, than
remedies restraining threatened or continuing violations or denying
the government the benefit of a violation.
50  , ,
On appeal, the Supreme Court 1 determined that violation, of
the fourth amendment by a federal agent acting under color of law does
create a cause of action for damages based on unconstitutional conduct.
Relying on language in Bell v. Hood,52 the Court found that although
there was, in fact, no provision for money damages, it is "well settled
that where legal rights are invaded and a federal statute 8 provides a
general right to sue for such invasion, the federal courts may use any
available remedy to make good the wrong done." 4 Justice Harlan's
concurrence suggested that a traditional judicial remedy such as dam-
ages is appropriate to the vindication of personal interests' protected by
the amendment. He also found that in suits for damages based on a
violation of federal statutes lacking the express authority for a dam-
ages remedy, the Supreme Court has authorized such relief where
"damages are necessary to effectuate the congressional policy under-
pinning substantive provisions of the statute."
55 I
In the securities area, the Supreme Court found in J. I. Case CO. v.
Borak,58 that the power granted by section 27 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 193457 to enforce any duty or liability under the Act,
implies the power to make the right of recovery effective.58 The Court
emphatically pointed out that "the answers [to questions concerning
48. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
49. 409 F.2d at 724-26.
50. Id. at 724.
51. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
52. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
53. In this case, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
54. 403 U.S. at 396, citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
55. Id. at 402, citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
56. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1970).
58. 377 U.S. at 433-34.
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the extent and nature of legal consequences] are to be derived from
the statute and the federal policy which it has adopted." 59
Another securities related case, Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache
Co.,6O involved a suit by plaintiff to recover losses suffered as a result
of a sale of securities from its margin account maintained with de-
fendant. The suit was based, in addition, on tort and contractual
theories, on a claim of a private right to damages under the Securities
Act due to Bache's conduct having violated a New York Stock Ex-
change rule, and the "just and equitable principles of trade" provi-
sions of section 6 (b) of the Act. With respect to implication of reme-
dies, Judge Friendly noted:
Implication of a private right of action may be suggested by explicit
statutory condemnation of certain conduct and a general grant of juris-
diction to enforce liabilities created by the statute... or from such
considerations as the protection intended by the legislature and the
ineffectiveness of existing remedies, administrative and judicial, fully
to achieve that end."'
Absent contrary legislation, where implication of a damages rem-
edy is deemed necessary to effect the protective purposes of a statute,
it is clear that, based on the grant of general jurisdiction to the federal
courts, an inherent power to adjust remedies will be found.62 That is,
the federal judiciary is free to fashion federal rules for decision where
they are necessary, such as where they are demonstrated to be of im-
portance in connection with a specific national interest and concern. 63
As the majority in Anderson v. Abbott"4 stated:
If the judicial power is helpless to protect a legislative program from.
schemes for easy avoidance, then indeed it has 'become a handy imple-
ment of high finance. Judicial interference to cripple or defeat a
legislative policy is one thing; judicial interference with the plans
of those whose corporate or other devices would circumvent that
policy is quite another. Once the purpose or effect of the scheme is
clear, 'once the legislative policy is plain, we would indeed forsake a
great tradition to say we were helpless to fashion the instruments for
appropriate relief.65
59. Id. at 433, citing with approval Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S.
1,73, 176 (1942) (emphasis added).
60. 358 F.2d-178 (2d Cir. 1966).
61. Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
62. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
'63. Katz, Jurisprudence of Remedies, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1968).
64. 321 U.S.,349 (1944).
65. Id. at 366-67.
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From the cases considered, it seems clear that the power to imply
remedies is, by inference, found to exist in the federal agency as well
as in the federal courts where such implication is necessary to carry
out the purposes of the statute pursuant to which the agency is acting.0
Where a damages remedy is the only effective means of combating
statutorily proscribed conduct, a court which would imply the remedy
would not strike down agency imposition of similar relief.
Because of the need for a back pay requirement to encourage
voluntary compliance, to erase discrimination against protected indi-
viduals, and to effect the clear and important public policy involved,
I believe that the courts would uphold agency imposition of such a
requirement under the Executive Order.
CONCLUSION
Back pay can legally be required by a contracting agency as an
element of affirmative action agreed to by a federal contractor based
on his acceptance of the provisions of section 202 (1) of the Executive
Order. The APA definition of sanction encompasses back pay remedy,
and the Executive Order allows for agency imposition of sanctions
which are otherwise provided by law. In addition, the contractual obli-
gation of the employer demands that he refrain from discriminating
against employees based on race, color, national origin, religion or
sex. Based on fundamental principles of contract law, specific perform-
ance may be demanded. Full performance would require that the ef-
fects of the breach be nullified and this can be done only by an award
of back pay. The general authority of an agency to fashion remedies
to effectuate the purpose for which it was formed offers an alternative
theory for the granting of a back pay award. Substantial evidence indi-
cates that where the federal courts find it necessary to grant either back
pay or a damages remedy in order to effectuate the purpose of a statute,
they will do so without hesitation-irrespective of whether such reme-
66. See, e.g., In re Karnack, United States Department of Health, Education and
Welfare Hearing No. CR-827 (Sept. 15, 1971), where the hearing examiner granted
back pay to teachers not reemployed in violation of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and section 10 of Policies on Elementary and Secondary School Compliance
with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The respondent district had dismissed
the teachers when it adopted a desegregation plan. The hearing examiner ruled that
"it is only fair to require the Respondent District to offer reemployment to [names of
teachers) with back pay . . ." as a condition for reinstating its eligibility to participate
in the Federal programs. No other basis for the award was given.
BACK PAY AWARDS
dies are specifically provided by statute. In view of this, a court ruling
on the question of back pay awards as remedial relief pursuant to
Executive Order 11246 would uphold a requirement by a federal
agency of back pay and this decision would establish back pay as a
remedy which is "otherwise provided by law" as required by section
202 (6) of the Executive Order.
The need for a back pay remedy under Executive Order 11246 is
clear. The Equal Opportunity Act of 1972 does not provide such re-
lief for (1) charges of discrimination made prior to March, 1972, (2)
charges made by a class alleging acts of discrimination against it as a
whole, or (3) elementary and secondary school teachers and princi-
pals. In addition, the 1972 enactment may take years to implement ef-
fectively, and requires a lawsuit to provide monetary relief in the form
of back pay. Judicial relief pursuant to section 1981 of title 42 of the
U.S.C. concerning private employment discrimination is available only
in six judicial circuits.67 Suits under section 1983 require defendant
action under color of state law,68 and generally involve only public
contractors. The Equal Pay Act6 9 deals solely with sex discrimination
and involves only the issue of unequal pay for equal work. In addition,
private suits are expensive and usually involve long time periods before
a decision is rendered.
Thus, since many employees of federal contractors have no effec-
tive remedy for employment discrimination and others who can bring
private suits find it a hardship to do so, Executive Order 11246 be-
comes the only source of relief. Because employees who suffer discrim-
ination currently have no remedy under the Executive Order, it is my
belief, based on legal and policy grounds, that back pay awards should
be required of federal contractors pursuant to the Executive Order.
67. See Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971);
Brown v. Gaston City Dyeing Mach. Co., 4 F.E.P. Cas. 515 (4th Cir. 1972); Sanders v.
Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 450
F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co.,
427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970); Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 995 (E.D.
Mo.), rev'd, 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972).
68. Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 450 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1971).
69. 29U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).

